From Security Weekly Wiki
Jump to navigationJump to search
#[ Google patches two more Chrome zero-days] - Anonymous, riiiiight: ''These two bugs mark the fourth and fifth zero-days that Google has patched in Chrome over the past three weeks. The difference this time is that while the first three zero-days were discovered internally by Google security researchers, these two new zero-days came to Google's attention after tips from anonymous sources.'' Two new ones: ''CVE-2020-16013 - Described as an "inappropriate implementation in V8," where V8 is the Chrome component that handles JavaScript code. CVE-2020-16017 - Described as a "use after free" memory corruption bug in Site Isolation, the Chrome component that isolates each site's data from one another.'' Some folks have been reading:
#[ The Term "Threat Intelligence" is Poisoned. It Does Not Mean What You Think it Means.] - You only really have to read this part: ''So, let’s start with Gartner’s definition of threat intelligence and go from there: “Threat intelligence is evidence-based knowledge, including context, mechanisms, indicators, implications and action-oriented advice about an existing or emerging menace or hazard to assets that can be used to inform decisions regarding the subject’s response to that menace or hazard.” However, many equate this definition to external sources of threat data only. The assumption and filter is that threat intelligence equals external threat data. But what about internal data – the telemetry, content and data created by each layer in our security architecture which, by the way, is free? Re-read the Gartner definition. It does not talk about external or internal data in the definition, instead focusing on knowledge and context.''
#[ Bugs in Critical Infrastructure Gear Allow Sophisticated Cyberattacks]- They brute-forced the key! Okay, but not really, the implementation had vulnerabilities that allowed brute-forcing to be feasible: ''“We are able to run an exhaustive key search to identify the encryption key that is used to encrypt the hashed password used to protect the application on the PLC,” ...The brute-force effort was made possible thanks to two flaws, researchers noted: First, the random nonce and secret key used in the encryption process are exchanged in cleartext...And secondly, the seed that is used to generate the keys is only two bytes long. This means that there are only 65,535 possible combinations of seed.''
#[ Yantra Manav A wormable SSH bot]
#[ SaltStack Salt REST API Arbitrary Command Execution]


Navigation menu